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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, ; 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
) CASE NO. 200202CA 
) PRIORITY NO. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i)( 1999). 
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions are relevant to this 
case, and their text is set forth in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION OF 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err by denying Norris's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous 
2 
standard for findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision. State v. 
Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60, P10, 983 P.2d 556 (Utah 1990). 
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in a motion before the trial court. R. 
1203. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err by not appointing new counsel to 
represent Norris with regards to his Motion to Appoint New Counsel, and his Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants in 
criminal proceedings are entitled to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of 
the proceeding against them. United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S. Ct. 
1926, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). 
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in motions before the trial court. R. 
00305,00364,01203,01219. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Was the instant prosecution barred by the statute of 
limitations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is issue presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correction, with no deference to the conclusions reached by the trial 
court. Forbes v. St. Mark's Hospital. 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). 
3 
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in a motion before the trial court. R. 
00162. 
ISSUE NO. 4: Was the information constitutionally defective, in that it failed 
to provide sufficient notice of the nature of the charges? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
which provides that an accused has the right "to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof." This provision has been held 
to require that the accused be given sufficient information "so that he can know the 
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his defense." 
State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985). 
PRESERVATION: This matter was raised in a motion before the trial court. 
T. 14:25, 15:1-4; 22:12-25; 25:7-21. 
ISSUE NO. 5: Was Norris denied effective assistance of counsel in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In challenging a conviction on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, it is defendant's burden to show (1) that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error. State 
v. Geary. 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985): see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 
4 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
PRESERVATION: This issue is properly raised for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App.1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant was originally charged, on December 14,1994, in the Third Circuit 
Court, West Valley Department, with four misdemeanor counts of 
Communications Fraud in violation of Utah Code 76-10-1801(1), in Case No. 
941004929 (hereafter "the misdemeanor case.") R. 00621. 
2. On February 6,1996, Judge Watson ordered the Amended Information in West 
Valley City dismissed because there was an alleged loss of $300.00 on each 
count, and Judge Watson ruled that the total loss for all four counts, which was 
$1,200.00, exceeded the jurisdictional limit of $1,000.00 for the circuit court. 
R. 00683-684. 
3. West Valley City appealed Judge Watson's order, arguing that the prosecution 
had the discretion to charge a lesser offense that what was actually committed. 
R.00700-702. 
4. Prior to the filing of the original charges with West Valley City, the case had 
been screened by both the Attorney General's Office and the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney's Office, and both agencies had declined to prosecute the 
5 
Defendant. R. 00586-589. 
5. On October 1, 1996, based on the same course of conduct underlying the 
original charges, Defendant was charged in the Third District Court with ten 
felony counts of Communications Fraud in violation of Utah Code 76-10-
1801(1), in Case No. 961020866 (hereafter "the first felony case"). R. 00049-
54. 
6. On December 5, 1996, Norris filed Motion for Bill of Particulars in the first 
felony case. R. 00739 (entry dated 12-5-96). 
7. On December 10,1996, the ten felony counts were ordered dismissed by Judge 
Palmer, because the misdemeanor case was still on appeal, and the prosecution 
was prohibited from simultaneously prosecuting separate charges in separate 
courts based on the same course of conduct. 
8. Also on December 10,1996, and immediately after the ten felony counts were 
dismissed, West Valley City filed a motion to dismiss its appeal in the 
misdemeanor case. R. 00201. 
9. On December 26, 1996, Defendant filed a motion in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss filed by West Valley City, on the grounds that the dismissal was 
sought solely for the purpose of filing felony charges, and requesting 
appointment of counsel. R. 00203-204. 
6 
10. On March 26,1997, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing the 
appeal in the misdemeanor case. R. 00785. 
1" On March 27, 1997, based on the same course o r conduct underlying the 
original charges, Defendant was charged in the Third District Court: with ten 
felony counts of Communication^ 1 lau* .. IOIULMM'I oi \ un I wck. <<- 0-
I Ml I I! I | i I iisc iNllnii "in ' H M » M J % ( h e r e u l t e i "the .second f e l o n y c a ., 
0 0 X 0 0 - X 0 S • : . 
1 iiriiiiii \ | n i l I I  I"11 )""' illn chai'i?^ - in lln " . ivond f r l o n v vnse were o r d r i n l 
dismissed by Judge Dever because the misdemeanor case was still technically 
.ore the Court of Appeals, having not yet been remitted back to the trial 
court. Based on the dismissal, Defendant was released from jail a th.ii d time. 
R 00809(entry dated 4-11-97). 
1.- I he misdemeanor case was reinracd ov Uiu *. MII V uuri oi Appeals io the trial 
couri v*. 
( linn 1 1.1 I! '"', I *' '> J , .iiiiiiiil Ii.i1 1,1 ill Ilk' sanim" i HIirMI" ml! I luiidlii I nihili"! 1\ iiu> illlii.1 
o r i g i n a l d i a r i e s 1 M r n d i i n l w j i s i i p n i n r h . ' i h ' i nil m t h e T h n ' ' ' ~ 
twenty felony counts of Communications Fraud in violation ol btah Code /o-
104801(1), in Case No. 971008355 (hereafter "the third felony tdbj ,. A. 
0002-11. 
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15. An arrest warrant was issued, and bail was set at $ 150,000.00, on request of the 
State, R. 00813, even though Judge Palmer ordered that the previously-ordered 
bail, which was set at $40,000.00, remain until the charges could be refiled. 
R. 00739 (entry dated 12-10-96). 
16. On May 16, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion to Recall the Remittur with the 
Utah Court of Appeals, on the grounds that the misdemeanor case should not 
have been remitted to the trial court until the expiration of the time for filing 
a petition for writ of certiorari, but was remitted prior to that date. R. 00210. 
17. On May 20, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash the Arrest Warrant, 
Strike Information, and Appoint Counsel with regards to the third felony case. 
R.00035. 
18. On June 2,1997, Judge Reese entered an order recalling the arrest warrant and 
staying the proceedings in the third felony case, pending resolution of the 
motion to dismiss with prejudice before Judge Dever. R. 00081-82. 
19. In the end, Norris was arrested four different times in conjunction with the 
charges underlying this case; once in the misdemeanor case in West Valley 
City, and three additional times, once each time a new felony information was 
filed in the district court. R. 0535, p. 11. 
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20. On June 30,1997, the Utah Court of Appeals recalled the remitti n p i irsi laiit to 
a n order by the Utah Supreme Court. R. 00795-796. 
21. On September 22, 1997, Defendant moved to dismiss the third felony case, on 
the same grounds that Judge Dever had dismissed the second felony case R 
00109. 
Stay tliii* Krmittiir p nndni|: disposition nt MrltMidiinl s IVlilioii tiiii V 'iiil I 
( Yitioniii in on (he dismissal o! tin; uppeal IIIII Ih iiiisdlniiciiiini cusr lh" (III " I I 
23. On October 6, i ^ 6 , Defendant's Petition fm W'rii nf CVrtioniri ( » iln- I I S 
Supreme Court was denied. R. 00217. 
24. On October 30, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals remitted the misdemeanor 
case back to the trial court. R. 00216 
25. On February 3, i 99v, a preliminary heuimgi. - * e in the instant case At 
III in .ill tin ic the State mo\ ed to dismiss counts 0 10, 1 Ji I I I •, N>„ 1 ", .iiiclll I M 
comply with statute of limitations. R. 159-160. 
On April 16, 1999, an amended information was filed in the third felony case, 
1: ii: fore Judge Reese, omitting the seven charges that were dismissed at the 
9 
preliminary hearing. R. 00218. 
28. On October 6, 1999, the Defendant filed a Motion to Appoint Substitute 
Counsel and Stay the Proceedings in the third felony case, alleging that there 
had been a complete breakdown in communication between the Defendant and 
his court-appointed counsel Gregory Skordas. R. 00306-314. 
38. On October 21, 1999, Judge Reese entered an order denying Norris' Motion 
to Dismiss based on improper use of expunged records, statute of limitations, 
lack of jurisdiction because of defective information (improperly filed before 
misdemeanor case was remitted from appellate court). 
29. On October 28, 1999, Defendant, through attorney Greg Skordas, filed a 
Motion for Bill of Particulars. R. 00332. 
30. On November 15, 1999, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
court's order denying his request for appointment of substitute counsel. R. 
00364-622. 
31. On November 17, 1999, on the date set for jury trial, Norris entered a plea of 
guilty to Counts I and III of the Information, and the rest of the counts were 
dismissed. 
32. On January 3,2000, Norris was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison 
on each count, with the sentenced to run concurrent. R. 1481-1488. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Basic Fact Underlying Case 
33. Ii i 1993, Norris operated a small business called Laroe International, which 
involved the sales of nutritional products. 
!"4, Norris placed '"help wanted* " ads in the newspaper for the position of "diet 
Lo anseior ;ulary of $ i per mont 11 U I \ .\ \ - ,! *[ *« 
\i\ I it1 in • • il I ill I en in in in 11 it- 11) ml I ill in ml 
salary-^ * i I" n i anat imii i iiniiiir s ion -hn^d cmplm iiiini ill 
the Stale alleee* aim Norris denied, thai Norris pressured poopl 
accepting the commission-based option. R. 0410, % 2, 0412, % 3 (Norris 's 
version); R. 30:16-25 ,31:1 14, 34:15-25,35:1 11 (State's version). 
36. Individuals who worked for Mr Norris on commission were asked to conipl) 
with certain requirements, such as making a -—ivun number o r sales 
presentations, before they would be guaranteed a base salary ; the State alleged, 
.Hid Non is denied, ili.il IIILM K'i|hiivinunL ncie impossible U> toinpl) \ MIII K 
IM 1111] "' (T iuMiiii,11.1 srrsion), 1 1 II M W> (Shil TIKI il • Il I IIII Mjilhni) II'! ill'" \ "' 
at 30:16-25, 31:1-14, 34:15-25, 35:1-11 (State's version). 
When people did not comply with the sales requirements, they were not paid 
the base salary. .R. 0410^12 (Norris'version), R. 01536 at 30:16-25,31:1-14, 
11 
34:15-25,35:1-11 (State's version) 
38. Many of these people signed contracts to purchase a certain amount of the diet 
product for resale; the State alleged, and Norris denied, that they were 
pressured into making these purchases. R. 01412,14 (Norris's version); R. 
01536 at 30:16-25, 31:1-14 (State's version). 
39. Many of those same individuals later did not pay for the quality of product 
which they had purchased, and Norris sued them in small-claims court and 
obtained judgments against them. R. 01536 at 30:16-25, 31:1-14 (State's 
version). 
40. With regards to Michael Mabry, the alleged victim in Count III, Norris dba 
Laroe International sued Mr. Mabry for $84.23 for a training manual, R. 
01437; and Mr. Mabry countersued Laroe International for $2,715.00, which 
amount included $715.00 for two weeks wages and $2,000.00 for punitive 
damages. R. 01439. Judgment was entered in Mr. Mabry's favor for $750.00. 
R. 01441. 
41. With regards to Joan Mattsen, the alleged victim in Count I, Ms. Mattsen 
signed a contract with Laroe International under which she would be paid 
$1,800.00 per month on the condition she make 129 presentations per month. 
R. 01427. Ms. Mattsen indicated that these requirements were impossible to 
12 
meet . R. 0146. M s . Mat tsen also signed a cuiv- • - - - purchase a qunnlil ' of 
diet products for $2024 .35 . R. 01446. Mo. Mat tsen testified that she did not 
have a chance to read the contract, and that she believed she was responsible 
for the product , but had not purchased it. R. 01456, R. 01406 ,1 ,atei; "\ f-. X* rris 
dba J ai t »e 1 nternational sued Ms. Mattsen for $ 1,960.48 for the unpaid contract 
aiiioiini puis court costs, aim ooiaincd a (udfjincm lor that amount k in I ill 
Ms M ill i in i (Hiiiik'i iimrtl Nimi loi IS IIIII11 Hill I ii llmsl ^iijLcs and pain and 
suf'ferinp " I 1 "III I *' ] I husm.ilh hiiiis nnifl n i l iun l llu1 |iul 11 n iiiliifjaiih.il Kill1 
Mattsei i to $1,496.94, nppar'.MiM* h". '• i < :\pr*' ,,l> '*' ' '" M Mu1t--<"i 
cated in the victim Impact s tatement that she realized that "it was a bad 
:i I::! al" after the first training session, and did not assert any monetary " loss 
besides attorney's fees, ^ 
OTHER RELL\Af 
iiNiii I ' iovciiitx I I , I '>(>0, I Jorns was sclK\u4iv vi ii-i .
 ( ui \ trial, and w^cr.^c* 
wilh i, tiiimisdl, as scheduled .' II Mir inoriiini1, ol ln.il I  !. 01 S« <o al J I ~->. 
H IN IOI In lln M'llr >v\ IIIIII (iiiLiil Nun is liull IIIMI VNITHI HI iliuns .JS1\IIIII;J loi 
substi tute counsel to be appointed and describing, amon; *•' * 
b reakdown in communicat ion that had occurred between Norr is and his trial 
counsel Gregory Skordas R , 00305 -314 , 
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44. In support of his Motion to Appoint Substitute Counsel, Norris provided a 
copy of a letter which he had written to Skordas on October 27,1999, less then 
a month before the trial, stating that Norris wanted to meet with Skordas to 
discuss trial strategy, and asking for Skordas' assurance that he would file a 
Motion for Bill of Particulars, among other things. R. 01368. 
45. Just prior to the date scheduled for trial, Norris retained David Grindstaff as 
private counsel. Mr. Grindstaff was present on the morning of trial and 
prepared to enter his appearance on Norris's behalf. R. 01536 at 12:18-25. 
46. Attorney David Grindstaff stated in an affidavit that aMr. Skordas was anxious 
to have myself replace himself as counsel of record because he was unable to 
properly prepare for trial because of lack of communication between himself 
and defendant." R. 01250-1251. 
47. On the morning of the trial, Gregory Skordas requested that the court continue 
the trial on the grounds that Norris had retained private counsel, who needed 
time to prepare for the trial. R. 01536 at 12:18-25, 13:1-20. 
48. Skordas also asserted, as grounds for his motion to continue, that there had 
been no previous continuances, that the State had not provided a Bill of 
Particulars, and that certain items requested in discovery had not been provided 
by the State. R. 01536 at 14:1-5. 
14 
Skordas filed a Motion for b m UJ 1 
and the motion was denied the day of trial on the grounds that it was filed late 
_.__.' HOI properly pursued prior to trial. R. 01536 at 22:12-25, 25:11-21. 
T
. support of this Motion (o Withdraw Guilty Plea, Norris submitted an 
ailidavn aiiesiiiig tu uic ioiiuwing: 
A I'noi" to oie date scheduled loi trial, bkoidas assured \.orns that the trial 
\ in i in I ill llni loiilinuul, mil Jitwsal Non i i In liiJiiL :,. ; cumed counsel 
prcsiMil nl (he In ill III'1 III i I ] \\\ 
j j . i l n ,ll|i • 'l M scheduled *> ,M ' lt , ftl;i ' «i n I • nhpocii.K'*! A\\\ 
uxw.woowo, including two attorneys who would testify' that Noi ris had 
sought legal advise from them regarding his marketing and business 
p i a :tices, and that they had advised Norris that his marketing scheme 
was legal. One of the attorneys would have also testified some of the 
alk ged v ictims testified differently in sman utiniis court than what they 
lalei Icsliilicd .il Iln |n< IIIIIIII.IIS hcaiin, I III * U\ |^ In I IK I » 
11 I N , II ! Il M l \\ , "HI /"""I „ II ! i: Il i I ; Il 1/ - nihi l i ill * Il H o n Ry ib tT ) , II ! I Il I 5 
77 lAf'iidjvil ul MmoliI Stevens), 
^ . On the day scheduled for trial, Skordas still had not reviewed relevant 
business records which had been seized by the Attorney General. R. 
15 
01341,1|25. 
D. On the day scheduled for trial, Skordas had not obtained arrest records 
for the alleged victims in the case, nor conducted any investigation into 
their backgrounds or histories. R. 01342. f 27. 
E. On the day scheduled for trial, Skordas still had not discussed 
significant aspects of the case with Norris, including whether Norris 
should testify in his own behalf, and whether Norris should proceed with 
a bench or jury trial. R. 01342, ^ 29. Furthermore, Skordas had not 
reviewed statements by the State's witnesses with Norris, or reviewed 
or discussed business records that were still on Norris' possession and 
that might have helped exonerate Norris. R. 01342,1f 26. 
F. The record reflects that Skordas did not submit proposed jury 
instructions to the court in advance of the date scheduled for trial, and 
did not submit proposed voir dire questions to the court. 
G. The trial court unexpectedly denied the motion to continue the trial, and 
announced that the jury trial would go forward as planned. R. 01536 at 
24:22. 
51. In support of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Norris submitted an 
affidavit alleging the following: 
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A. Once it was determined that the trial would go forward as plan ned. 
j) Skordas met with Norris privately and urged Norris to enter a 
i of guilty to two felony counts, under a pica bargain wherein the rest 
o i UK- counts would be dismissed. R 01 'U-i-1c. 
.•wiJuslol d N o IT i s, among ot 11 e r m 1 n u >. u i a i i f Norr i s di d not enter 
il( i In (In hMt i ntinh a:, pmposed, (hen he wou ld snrels be 
1 «il ||I i'\Hlh i * iiiiiiih III1 III I II II ]| i i k i l l Mums v\\nc [<d 
doubt about cnlerinp i plea Shiul. is luhl Inn ih.tl tin lut l^r \MN hi In 
, jf Morris forced the case to trial, and that Norris win 11 d rrcoi vc the 
maximum penalty. R. 01345,143. 
(~* With regards to the plea colloquy; Skordas instructed Norris to answer 
the question with a simple yes or no, and warned Norris against asking 
qi lestions or trying to qucmU his answers during the plea colloqi ly R 
Il I i ihe pressure excited on him In SMu'ivlif\ .ind III'N nbsen J INU I ih,|f 
Skordas was not prepared for trinl, lKJorns Ml Ilia,! hi* lu.l iu Inm i hi 1 
to accept the plea bargain, and enter a guilty plea. K. ui344, ][ 37. 
52, The prosecutor offered, as a factual basis for the guilty plea to Count I: 
"What the evidence would show is that back in between March and Juiu 
of 1993, the defendant ran an ad in the newspaper, essential!} o f f e r s 
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people a job, and that he was going to pay approximately $1,400.00 a 
month for people to come in and work for him as diet consultants or 
counselors or whatever you want to call it. Ms. Madsen responded to 
the ad that was in the newspaper. They were supposed to go to work for 
a company called LaRoe International, which Mr. Norris was the 
president of. They responded to the ad by calling the telephone number 
that was listed in the ad in the newspaper. She then met with Mr. Norris. 
They discussed what was involved in her employment. He told her she 
was going to be hired. She signed the contracts with him. She never got 
paid anything. Never made a dime while working for him. He 
eventually said he was going to sue her because she had obtained the 
product. Told her one of the conditions was that she had to buy the 
product in addition to coming to work. She tried to return it. He said 
no, and he ultimately ended up I think either suing her or threatening to 
sue her over the product. That was in excess of $1,000.00 for the loss. 
R. 01536 at 30:16-25, 31:1-14. 
53. The prosecutor offered, as a factual basis for the guilty plea to Count III: 
[The factual basis is similar, although the name of the victim is different 
and] the one thing I might add by way of a proffer is we had intended to 
call two secretaries who then worked for Mr. Norris, who would 
essentially say that afer working for him during this time frame, it was 
their conclusion that this was just a scam or a scheme to defraud the 
public. That it was all designed to make people think they were getting 
a job, coming to work, and then when they got there he would have them 
sign a contract, with no intention of every paying any of these people. 
Ultimately the scheme was that it would allow him to sue these people 
and get money from the people he was suing. They would testify about 
conversations they had with him concerning what he was trying to do 
and he had no intentions of ever paying any of the people that responded 
to this ad. 
R. 01536 at 34:15-25, 35:1-11. 
54. It was agreed by the trial court that, in spite of the guilty plea, certain issues 
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would be reserved for appeal, specifically including, (1) statute of limitations, 
(2) use of expunged records, (3) court's failure to remove Greg Skordas and 
appoint substitute counsel, (4) speedy trial issues, (5) objections related to Bill 
of Particulars, (6) vindictive prosecution, (7) ineffective assistance of counsel, 
(8) lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on defective information, (9) 
State's failure to provide discovery, and (9) the constitutionality of the Utah 
Communications Fraud Statute. R. 01536 at 36-44. 
5 5. After specifically reserving each of the above-mentioned issues as having been 
reserved for appeal, Norris stated "I'm not sure if there are other issues," and 
the trial court answered, "I guess we could just leave it at you're reserving the 
right to appeal any issue that the Court has heard and ruled on, but ruled 
adversely to you . . . you'd have a right to appeal that issue." R. 01536 at 
45:13-23. 
56. On November 19,1999, two days after entering his plea of guilty, Norris wrote 
a letter to Judge Reese, stating that Norris intended to withdraw his plea. R. 
01201. 
57. On November 30, 1998, Norris filed pro se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
and Request for Appointment of Substitute Counsel, asserting the grounds set 
forth above. R. 01203. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by denying Norris's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
where Norris provided evidence that he was coerced into entering the plea of guilty 
after his counsel failed to prepare for trial, relying on his belief that the trial would 
be continued, and then pressured Norris into entering a guilty plea the on the schedule 
trial date. Furthermore, the trial court erred by refusing to appoint substitute counsel 
for Norris, and thereby forcing Norris to represent himself with regards to his Motion 
for Substitute Counsel and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, where those motions 
were critical stages in the criminal proceedings. 
Additionally, the criminal information failed to provide sufficient notice of the 
nature of the charges against Norris, so as to allow him to adequately prepare his 
defense, where the information merely recited the broad language of the 
Communications Fraud statute, and did not specify the nature of the fraudulent 
scheme or artifice, nor identify the communication, both of which are essential 
elements of the offense. Moreover, the prosecution was barred by the statute of 
limitations where the conduct underlying the charges occurred in Spring of 1993, and 
the felony information could not have been effectively filed, so as to toll the clock for 
the purposes of the statute of limitations, until October 1999, because until that date, 
a misdemeanor case based on the exact same conduct was pending before the Utah 
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Court of Appeals. Finally, Norris was denied effective assistance of counsel when 
his attorney failed to request a Bill of Particulars, and showed up for trial patently 
unprepared, and thus placed Norris in a position where he had no choice but to plead 
guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea. 
The trial court erred by denying Norris's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
where the plea was taken on the day of trial, without prior notice to the court, and 
under immense pressure from Norris's former attorney, who clearly was not prepared 
to go forward with the trial on that day; and where Norris was clearly misled about 
the benefits that he would derive from the plea. 
In Utah, "[a] plea of guilty... may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of the [trial] court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999). A 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty is an acknowledgment that the 
accused is guilty of the offense charged. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2 (1982). The 
rationale for allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is to permit him to undo 
a plea which was unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily made. See e ^ United 
States v. Carr. 740 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 85 L. 
Ed. 2d 159, 105 S. Ct. 1865 (1985). Withdrawal of a plea of guilty is admittedly 
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privilege, not a right, see State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981), and the 
granting of a presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Bennett. 657 P.2d 1353, 1354 (Utah 1983) (per 
curiam). 
However," [a] defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several 
constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 
his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be 
valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be 'an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 
459, 466, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969)(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally 
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is 
therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of 
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses 
an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Zerbst at 466. 
"The court has an undoubted duty to guard against the possibility that an 
accused who is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to plead guilty without 
sufficient understanding of the nature of the charge or the consequence of his plea, 
or that the plea may be improperly induced by cajolery, deception, plea bargaining 
22 
pressure, or other improper motivation." State v. Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977); 
Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). 
Accordingly, and "[b]ecause the entry of [a guilty] plea constitutes such a waiver, and 
because the prosecution will generally be unable to show that it will suffer any 
significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted." State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1987). 
Coercive Circumstances Underlying Entry of Guilty Plea 
In the instant case, Norris entered his guilty plea under circumstances that can 
only be described as coercive. First, Norris had filed two separate motion during the 
weeks preceding the trial date, describing a breakdown in communication between 
him and his attorney and his frustration that his attorney was not properly preparing 
for trial (e.g. his attorney's failure to request a bill of particulars), and basically 
imploring the court to appoint new counsel. Secondly, it is clear that Norris did not 
come to court on the day scheduled for trial with any plans of entering a guilty plea, 
and had in fact hired another attorney to represent him, and was under the clear 
impression that the trial would be continued. Thirdly, it is also clear, even from the 
sparse record, that Mr. Skordas was not prepared to go to trial on the scheduled day. 
Mr. Skordas apparently believed, just as Norris asserts, that the trial would 
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undoubtedly be continued, based on his belief that there had been no previous 
continuances, his offer to have Mr. Norris pay the jury fees, the fact that the State had 
not provided a Bill of Particulars, and the availability of new counsel to resolved the 
conflicts and issues which Norris had raised in his motions. 
The fact that Skordas believed the trial would be continued, and thus was not 
prepared to go forward with the trial that day, is made apparent by the fact that 
Skordas did not subpoena a single defense witness, nor prepare exhibits, nor submit 
jury instructions or voir dire questions. 
Under these circumstances, Norris was clearly placed in a situation where he 
had no choice but to accept the plea bargain, and enter a plea to two felony counts, 
and compliantly go through the Rule 11 colloquy, indicating that he knew what he 
was doing and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Norris had previously 
attempted, and attempted again the morning of trial, to bring his dissatisfaction with 
his attorney to the court's attention. His efforts were of no avail. Accordingly, the 
limited choice proposed to him by his attorney was a compelling and coercive one: 
Plead guilty to two counts, or be convicted of twelve. Period. There were no other 
choices, because the attorney simply had not come to court prepared for trial. 
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Norris truly understood the 
precise nature of the charges against him. The State's recitation of the factual basis 
24 
for the charge did not specifically identify the scheme or artifice, nor the 
communication in furtherance thereof, and it is quite possible that Mr. Norris 
understood that he was guilty of the offense based on some conduct that did not 
constitute an offense under the Communications Fraud Statute. His own statement 
regarding his conduct, contained in the Statement of Defendant, Certificate of 
Counsel and Order, was as follows: "Defendant ran an ad which made promises 
which were misleading. The defendant did not deliver as promised." R. 01273. This 
assertion does not encompass an offense under the Utah Communications Fraud 
Statute, because it does not identify an artifice or scheme to defraud, nor a 
communication in furtherance thereof. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). 
A plea of guilty, and the waiver of the important constitutional rights inherent 
therein, simply cannot be deemed voluntary and knowing under these circumstances. 
Norris' motion to withdraw his guilty plea sufficiently set forth and documented 
these facts, and the trial court's denial of the motion clearly constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
ENTRY OF PLEA BASED ON NON-EXISTENT BENEFITS 
The trial court also should have allow Norris to withdraw his guilty plea 
because he entered his plea based on benefits, offered in exchange for the plea, that 
were non-existent. In State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
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Supreme Court held that where a defendant entered his "'plea with an exaggerated 
belief in the benefits of his plea," his plea should not be considered voluntary. Id at 
1275 (quoting People v. Lawson. 75 Mich. App. 726, 255 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1977)): see also State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129.130 (Utah 1976): Hammond 
v. United States. 528 F.2d 15, 19 (4th Cir. 1975). 
In the instant case, Norris took great pains, before entering his plea, to reserve 
his right to appeal based on vindictive prosecution. R. 1536 at 39:12-25, 40:1-6.* 
lrThe basic facts underlying his proposed vindictive prosecution claim are as 
follows: 
In the course of some of the small claims cases brought by Norris against 
other individuals in West Valley City, Norris appeared before Judge Pro Tern 
Crippen. On June 24, 1993, Judge Crippen had entered several default judgments 
in Norris's favor, when one of the defendants appeared, and was assisted by an 
attorney named Russell Cline. R. 0378, fflf 36-38 (plus exhibits in support thereof). 
Judge Pro Tern Crippen ruled in the woman's favor, and awarded her $500.00 
although she had not filed a counterclaim, and also sua sponte reversed the default 
judgments against the other defendants. R. 00379 fflf 43-46 (pus exhibits in 
support thereof). Judge Crippen dismissed all of the other cases which had been 
brought by Norris, without hearing those cases. R. 00379, f^ 47 (plus exhibits in 
support thereof). Judge Crippen advised the woman from the bench to contact the 
Utah Attorney General and the press, f 47. Norris later learned that Judge Crippen 
had a business relationship with attorney Cline. R. 00378, fflf 38-40 (plus exhibits 
in support thereof). 
Shortly after Norris appeared before Judge Crippen on June 24, 1993, there 
was negative media coverage regarding Norris' business practices. Judge Crippen 
and several West Valley City police officers made negative statements about 
Norris to the media. R. 00383, ^ f 53 (and exhibits in support thereof). 
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This was a claim that was important to him, and one which he had repeatedly raised 
through the course of these proceedings. R. 00759:18-26. The trial court affirmatively 
led Norris to believe that this particular issue would be preserved, and that Norris 
would have a chance to raise the issue on appeal. R. 1536 at 44:5-20. Although the 
trial court stated, "[You're reserving the right to appeal any issue that the Court has 
heard and ruled on, but ruled adversely to you . . . , " r. 01536 at 45:13-23, it did so 
after affirmatively assuring Norris that his claim for vindictive prosecution was 
During July of 1993, the West Valley City police investigated the 
complaints against Norris, and had them screened by the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's office. In a report dated July 15, 1993, the West Valley City Police 
prepared a report of the investigation, and indicated that the District Attorney's 
office declined to accept the case for prosecution, and felt that the case was "civil 
in nature." R. 00586-589. 
On June 22, 1994, Norris filed a civil suit against WVC City Police 
Detective Humphry, WVC Judge Pro Tern Crippen, and others for defamation. R. 
00384, ][ 64 (and exhibits in support thereof). Norris did not serve a summons on 
any of the defendants until December 14, 1994, when he served a summons on 
Detective Humphry. R. 00384, f^ 66 (and exhibits in support thereof). 
On December 20, 1994, six days after Detective Humphry was served with 
the summons in the civil case, a criminal Information was filed against Norris by 
West Valley City. R. 00384, f 67 (and exhibits in support thereof). 
Once the circuit court dismissed the misdemeanor charges, Norris asserts 
that the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office continued the vendetta that 
had been commenced by the West Valley City Attorney, by filing three separate 
Information, with increasing numbers of charges in each subsequent one, and by 
filing each of them when the misdemeanor case was still pending in the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
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reserved for appeal, and only in response to Norris's concerns that he had not 
identified all of the issues he wished to preserve in addition to the vindictive 
prosecution claim. While Norris' was clearly led to believe that his claim for 
vindictive prosecution was preserved for appeal, the claim cannot be reviewed on 
appeal because it was not raised nor briefed before the trial court, and a record was 
not created in support of the claim. See State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781,783-84 (Utah 
1992) (footnote omitted). 
Moreover, Norris's claim for vindictive prosecution was not frivolous, and his 
belief that he could pursue that claim was clearly a determinative factor in his 
decision to enter a guilty plea. "A claim for vindictive prosecution ordinarily arises 
when, during the course of criminal proceedings, a defendant exercises constitutional 
or statutory rights and the government seeks to punish him therefore by instituting 
additional or more severe charges." United States v. Wall 37 F.3d 1443, 1448 (10th 
Cir. 1994). In Poole v. County of Otero. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19752, the Tenth 
Circuit recognized that a criminal prosecution for the purpose of deterring access to 
the courts may constitute vindictive prosecution. The Wall court explained: 
Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, is 
nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill 
individuals1 exercise of constitutional rights." Dawes v. Walker, 239 
F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). We recognize that a 
trivial or de minimis injury will not support a retaliatory prosecution 
claim. See id. at 493: Bloch v. Ribar. 156 F.3d 673,679 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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This court has suggested that the alleged injury should be one that 
"would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in 
that activity." Worrell v. Henry. 219 F.3d 1197, 1213 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(quotation omitted). Therefore, the injury need not actually have 
deterred Mr. Poole from filing this lawsuit. See £4*. Gomez v. Vernon, 
255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (ff[A] retaliation claim may assert 
an injury no more tangible than a chilling effect of First Amendment 
rights."); B]och, 156 F.3d at 679 (noting that injuries such as emotional 
distress are compensable under § 1983). 
Id at 10-11. The court concluded: 
[F]acing criminal charges that were brought in order to hinder or prevent 
him from filing a civil lawsuit against defendants is injury sufficient to 
chill a person of ordinary firmness. 
Id. at 1 l-12.Although the issue was not properly raised or briefed before the trial 
court, the facts asserted here demonstrate that Norris had a prima face claim of 
vindictive prosecution, and that it would have been a significant benefit to him to be 
able to raise such a claim of appeal, as he was assured he could do when he entered 
his plea of guilty. In the end, the benefit that was promised to him was non-existent, 
and under State v. Copeland, he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea. 
In sum, because of the coercive circumstances underlying the entry of Norris's 
plea and Norris's exaggerated belief in the benefit of the plea, the plea was not 
knowing and voluntary, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying Norris's 
motion to withdraw the plea. 
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II. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Appoint Counsel to Represent 
Norris in his Motion to Appoint Substitute Counsel and his Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
According to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
trial and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and District 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and the 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
the have the Assistance of Counsel in his defense. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants in criminal proceedings are entitled 
to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding against them. 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,226, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). 
Critical stages can include those conducted "at or after the initiation of adversary 
criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information or arraignment." Gilmore v. Armontrout 861 F.2d 1061, 
1070(8thCir. 1988)fquotingKirbvv. Illinois.406U.S. 682, 689.92 S. Ct. 1877,32 
L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972)), cert, denied 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S. Ct. 3176, 104 L. Ed. 2d 
1037 (1989). Critical stages also can include steps in the proceedings in which the 
accused is confronted by the procedural system or the prosecutor or both, United 
States v. Gouveia. 467 U.S. 180, 189, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1984), and 
where available defenses may be irretrievably lost. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 
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52, 54, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961). The Supreme Court has explained that: 
In addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need 
not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or 
informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the 
accused's right to a fair trial We scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the 
accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to 
preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial. . . . 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27. In U.S. v. Wadsworth. 830 F.2d 1500. 1510-11 (9th Cir. 
1987), the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant in that case was entitled under the 
Sixth Amendment to counsel at a hearing on his motion to appoint substitute counsel. 
In Wadsworth, the defendant filed a motion to appoint substitute counsel the day 
before trial, basically alleging that his counsel had not prepared a defense. Id. at 1505. 
The court denied the defendant's motion, after eliciting and relying on a statement 
from the defendant's attorney which contradicted the defendant's allegations. Id. at 
1511. The Ninth Circuit determined that although the defendant's counsel of record 
was present at the hearing, the defendant was unrepresented by counsel due to the fact 
that his attorney of record had taken a position which was adversarial to the 
defendant. Id, 
In the instant case, Norris was forced to represent himself with regards to both 
his Motion to Appoint New Counsel and his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, both 
of which were meritorious, as argued above. Norris filed the motions, and argued 
them, pro se. Not only that, but, like the attorney in Wadsworth, Norris's attorney 
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took an adversarial stance with regards to the Motion to Appoint New Counsel, and 
made statements to the court which directly conflicted with the allegations advanced 
by Norris. R. 01536 at 5-7. Clearly, these were critical stages of the proceedings 
because the State opposed Norris on these motions, and Norris was improperly 
forced to stand alone against the State. Not only that, but with regards to the Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea, numerous constitutional rights were at stake, including the 
right to jury trial. Accordingly, the trial court erred by not appointing substitute 
counsel for Norris to represent him during these proceedings. 
III. The Information Was Defective Because it Failed to Give Defendant 
Sufficient Notice of the Conduct Alleged to Constitute the Offense. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right. . . to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him [and] to have a copy thereof." Utah Const, art I, § 12. In 
State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 84 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 
777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1988), the Utah Supreme Court explained that this provision 
requires "that the accused be given sufficient information 'so that he [or she] can 
know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his 
[or her] defense.'" 14 at 1214 (quoting State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 
1985)): see also State v. Taylor. HUtah 2d 107,108,378 P.2d352,353 (1963); State 
v. Mvers. 5 Utah 2d 365, 372, [* 104] 302 P.2d 276, 280 (1956). 
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As the Utah Supreme Court explained in State v. BelL 770 P.2d 100, 104. n 
5(Utah 1988): 
Even prior to the explicit articulation of the state constitutional basis for 
requiring notice in such recent cases as Fulton and earlier cases, such as State 
v. Solomon. 93 Utah 70, 74-76, 71 P.2d 104, 106-07 (1937), this Court 
followed a widely recognized general rule that notice must include sufficient 
details of the factual circumstances constituting the crime charged to enable the 
accused to know precisely what the charge is so he or she may (i) decide what 
plea to make, (ii) prepare a defense, and (iii) be protected from later facing 
additional charges based on the same circumstances. See, e,g., State v. 
lopham, 41 Utah 39, 123 P. 888 (1912). 
The Bell court also explained that when an indictment or information does not 
provide the notice guaranteed by article I, section 12, the accused may request a bill 
of particulars under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. "Once such 
a request is made, the accused is entitled to receive, and the State has the burden of 
providing, a written bill of particulars which, in conjunction with the indictment or 
information, gives notice of the particulars of the charges in sufficient factual detail 
to enable the accused to prepare an adequate defense." Bell,770 P.2d at 104; Fulton, 
742 P.2d at 1214; see also State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 4(e). 
In the instant case, the information merely repeated verbatim the broad, vague 
language of the Utah Communications Fraud statute for each of the ten counts. R. 
00218-00223. Each count states: 
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On or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
Defendant RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a 
scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from [alleged victim's 
name] money or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, material omission, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person 
by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, 
artifice or fraud, and the value and the loss or the thing sought to be 
obtained is over $1,000.00. 
R. 00218-00223. In addition to the language set forth in each of the counts, the 
probable cause statement asserts: 
During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran ad in the newspaper. The 
ad made certain promises and representations to those responding 
concerning employment and salary. Numerous people responded to the 
ad and met with the defendant. The defendant had each person sign an 
agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained 
judgments against many of the people. 
This statement simply causes more confusion that it dispels. First, it simply 
does not describe the nature of the "communication" which is at the heart of the 
offense. Furthermore, while the statement asserts that "the defendant did not deliver 
as promised," it does not identify the promise was that he failed to deliver on. Was 
it the representations in the newspaper ad that he failed to deliver on, or was it the 
"agreement that each person signed" that he failed to deliver on? Was the "scheme 
or artifice" the allegedly misleading newspaper ad, or the signed agreement, or the 
bringing of claims in small claims court? It is simply and clearly impossible to know 
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by the language of the Information. 
In fact, the Information and supplemental statement in this case are nearly 
identical to the ones in Bell.2 As the Bell court noted: 
2
 The indictment in Bell read: 
Between September, 1982 and June 23, 1983, in Weber County, State 
of Utah, the said Steven Bell did receive proceeds derived, directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he or she 
has participated, as a principle [sic], and has used or invested, directly 
[sic] or indirectly, some part of such proceeds, or in the acquisition of 
any interest in or the establishment or operation of any enterprise; 
and/or 
Through a pattern of racketeering activity has acquired or maintained, 
directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise; and/or 
While employed by or associated with an enterprise did conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise's functions 
through a pattern of racketeering activity; and/or 
Did attempt or conspire to violate any provisions of 76-10-1603 (1) (2) or 
(3) UCA 1953 as amended; or did aid another in the violation of 76-10-1603 
(1) (2) or (3) UCA 1953, as amended. 
The supplemental statement of facts provided in the Bill of Particulars, 
provided: 
1. Specific activities of racketeering include those listed in the wiretap and 
those provided in the transcripts of the Grand Jury. 
2. As to a statement of what constitutes [sic] a racketeering activity, this 
calls for a legal conclusion and is beyond factual information necessary to 
set forth an essential elements [sic] of the offense charged. Defendant 
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The record shows that at trial, the State presented three theories as to 
who or what factually constituted the enterprise: Bell as an individual, 
the group of persons associated with Molly Kingston, or Bell's 
convenience store. By no stretch of the imagination could the single 
enigmatic sentence in paragraph 3 of the State's reply to Bell's request 
be construed as containing sufficient factual information to describe the 
State's actual theories of this essential element of the crime, much less 
to permit Bell to prepare his defense on this element. 
BelL770 P.2d at 104. In the instant case, the State's own version of the events 
presented at the plea hearing as the "factual basis for the plea," demonstrates that 
there were various conceivable theories of the "artifice or scheme" and the 
"communication" which were essential elements of the charges. For instance, the 
State conceivably described a sort of bait-and-switch scheme, where individuals 
responded to ads for employment, and then were pressured into signing contracts for 
purchase of products for resale. Under this theory, Norris would have presented a 
defense wherein other individuals would testify that they chose the employment 
option, versus the commission option, and were indeed paid for their work, and thus 
should clearly realize this. 
3. Enterprise consists of the trafficking [sic] in controlled substances and 
investing the proceeds. 
Bell, 770 P.2d at 105, 105, n. 9. 
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demonstrate that these individuals chose the commission option from other available 
options. 
The State also conceivably described a scheme wherein Norris pressured 
individuals into signing contracts with terms that were impossible to comply with, 
and then failed to pay them because of their inevitable failure to comply with the 
terms. Under this theory, Norris would have presented a defense wherein former 
salespeople would testify that the terms were not impossible to comply with, and had 
in fact been complied with by many, and in such cases, the employees had been paid 
as agreed. 
The State also conceivably described a scheme wherein Norris would pressure 
people to sign a contract for the purchase of product, and then sue them in small 
claims court when they refused to pay for the product. Under this theory, Norris 
would have presented witnesses to testify that they were not pressured into buying the 
product, and that they were allowed to return the product if they changed their mind 
after the purchase. 
Clearly, in this case, as in Bell "My no stretch of the imagination could the 
[factual information provided by the State] be construed as containing sufficient 
factual information to describe the State's actual theories of [the] essential elements] 
of the crime, much less to permit [Norris] to prepare his defense on [those] 
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elements]. IdL at 105. 
Since the Information was clearly inadequate, the next question is whether 
Norris properly requested a Bill of Particulars from the State. The record shows that 
Greg Skordas requested a Bill of Particulars from the State on October 29, 1999. R. 
00328-352. Since the trial was scheduled for November 17, 1999, the timing of the 
request allowed the State at least two weeks to comply with the request, and yet the 
State did not comply. On the day scheduled for trial, when asked about the request, 
the State asserted: 
The probable cause statement outlines what the evidence is or what our 
theory of the case is. The defense has the benefit of sitting through a 
preliminary hearing. They have a transcript from the prelim. That 
outlines essentially our case and everything they're asking for, I think. 
The Bill of Particulars is set forth and set out in those documents. 
R. 0156 at 17:9-21. In Bell the Utah Supreme Court rejected the idea that notice can 
be imputed from the overall materials available to a defendant, and made it clear that 
"[a] defendant, having complied with the procedural requirements of rule 4(e) in 
requesting a bill of particulars, ought not to have to look beyond the indictment or 
information and the bill of particulars to obtain sufficient notice of the specific 
allegations to be faced at trial." Bell at 107. Thus, it is clear that the State simply did 
not comply with Norris's request for a Bill of Particulars. 
When the State's failure to comply was raised before the trial court, the court 
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stated that "the failure to respond to the Bill of Particulars concerns me a little bit," 
and then denied the motion on the grounds that it was filed late, "only two to three 
weeks before trial." R. 01536 at 22:12-25. It was clearly an error on the part of the 
trial court to force Norris to proceed to trial under the defective Information, 
especially where Norris had previously complained that his attorney had ignored his 
requests to file the Motion for Bill of Particulars, and requested a continuance of the 
trial date on that very basis.3 
In sum, the Information in the instant case clearly failed to provide adequate 
notice to enable Norris to prepare his defense, as required by Article I, section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution, and the trial court erred by forcing Norris to proceed to trial 
on the defective information, where Norris requested a Bill of Particulars three weeks 
before trial, and would have requested one sooner, if not for the ineffectiveness of his 
trial counsel. 
IV. The Instant Prosecution Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
The trial court erred by denying Norris's Motion to Dismiss based on Statute 
3In the alternative, Norris asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to 
continue the trial date in light of all of the circumstances described herein. 
Although the decision whether to grant a continuance is within the discretion of 
the trial court, see State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982), the decision 
to refuse a continuance may constitute reversible error if there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence. State v. 
Featherson. 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). 
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of Limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 provides that a prosecution for a felony 
must be commenced within four years, and that a prosecution is commenced by the 
filing on a criminal complaint or information. 
The Information in the instant case alleges that the conduct at issue occurred 
in Spring of 1993. R. 00002-11. The Information was purportedly filed on May 15, 
1998. Id. However, as argued below, the Information in the instant case was 
improperly filed at a time when another case, based on the exact same course of 
conduct, was pending before the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 00646-648 (misdemeanor 
information with probable cause statement), R. 00002-11, (felony information in 
instant case with probable cause statement containing same allegations as in felony 
case), R. 00211 (order recalling remittur), R. 00214 (order staying remittur pending 
resolution of Petition for Writ of Certiorari before U.S. Supreme Court). R. 00216. 
On May 20, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash the Arrest Warrant, 
Strike Information, and Appoint Counsel with regards to the instant case, on the 
grounds that the misdemeanor case was still pending before the Court of Appeals. 
R. 00035. On June 2,1997, Judge Reese entered an order recalling the arrest warrant 
and staying the proceedings in the instant case. R. 00081-82. Ultimately, the 
Information in the instant case was not dismissed, but was simply stayed until the 
Remittur on the misdemeanor case was finally properly issued on October 30, 1998. 
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R. 00124, 00166^9. 
Although the remittur on the misdemeanor case was erroneously issued (prior 
to the expiration of the time for filing petition for writ of certiorari, in violation of 
Rule 36(A)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure), this did not divest the 
appellate court of jurisdiction, nor confer jurisdiction on the trial court. 
In High Country Estates v. Foothill Water. 942 P.2d 305,306 (Utah 1996), the 
Utah Supreme Court reiterate that "the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a 
case while it is pending on appeal. An appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction 
over a case while it is under advisement on appeal." Furthermore, the High Country 
Estates court held that where remittur is prematurely and erroneously issued, prior to 
the expiration of time to file petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court is without 
jurisdiction, and the case is still "pending in the appellate courts." Id at 307. 
The critical question here is whether the information purportedly filed on May 
15, 1997, was properly filed, so as to toll the clock for the purposes of the statute of 
limitations. If it was not properly filed until the remittur on the misdemeanor case was 
properly issued, then prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, since the 
conduct is alleged to have occurred in March through June of 1993, and the remittur 
was not issued (thereby allowing proper filing of the felony information) until 
October 30, 1999. The question of the whether the Information was properly filed 
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turns on whether a criminal information can be properly filed, and thus toll the 
statute-of-limitations clock, when another case charging the same offense, based on 
the same course of conduct, is simultaneously pending in another court. The answer 
to this question is clearly no. Rule 9.5(1 )(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states: 
Unless otherwise provided by law., complaints, citations, or information 
charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state law, 
county ordinances, or municipal ordinances, and arising from a single 
criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-40], shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction over the charged offense with the 
highest possible penalty of all offenses charges. 
Based on this rule alone, the trial court should have granted Norris' motion to 
strike the information, and his later motion to dismiss, since the rule prohibits the 
filing of duplicative criminal complaints in different courts. Had Judge Reese 
properly dismissed the Information, it could not have been refilled until October of 
1999, after the remittur was issued on the misdemeanor case. 
Furthermore, the Utah constitutional requirement of due process and 
fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings, Utah Const, art. I, § 7, surely prohibits 
the State from carrying out simultaneous prosecutions in separate courts for the same 
offense.4 
4A claim of error based on double jeopardy seems to be precluded by 
Willhauck v. Flannagan. 448 U.S. 1323, 1325 (1980), in which the U.S. Supreme 
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In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that State refiling of a dismissed charge is limited by due process protections of 
the Utah Constitution. The Brickey court noted that granting the State unbridled 
discretion in determining whether to refile charges raises the intolerable specter of 
the State's continually harassing a defendant who previously had charges dismissed 
for insufficient evidence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-47. The court recognized that "the 
prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection for the accused." IcL The important 
purpose underlying the Brickey rule, which is relevant also to the case at hand, is to 
protect defendants from intentional prosecutorial harassment arising from repeated 
filings of groundless claims before different magistrates in the hope that some 
magistrate will eventually bind the defendants over for trial. Id. at 647; accord State 
v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Brickey rule "ensures that the 
defendant is not harassed by repeated charges on tenuous grounds"). 
Surely, the specter of potential harassment raised by the unlimited discretion 
of prosecutors to file simultaneous charges in separate courts is at least as great, if not 
greater, than that raised by the unlimited discretion to refile charges after a dismissal. 
Court held, in response to an argument that simultaneous prosecutions in two 
different courts for the same offense violated double jeopardy, that such a claim 
was premature where a jury had not yet been impaneled, and thus jeopardy did not 
yet attach, in either case. 
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Based on the same reasoning adopted in Brickey, this Court should recognize that 
Rule 9.5(1 )(A) has constitutional underpinnings which prevent the State from 
pursuing a second prosecution while identical charges are pending in another court. 
In sum, because Rule 9.5(1 )(A) and Utah Const, art. I, § 7, prohibit 
simultaneous prosecution of identical charges in two separate courts, the filing of the 
Information in the instant case on May 15, 1998 was ineffective, and did not toll the 
clock for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Since the remittur was not issued 
on the misdemeanor case until October of 1999, this was the first possible date for 
proper filing of the felony charge; and by that time, the prosecution was barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
V. Norris Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel. 
In challenging a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
it is defendant's burden to show (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance 
in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably 
have been different but for counsel's error. State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985); 
see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984). This issue is properly raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 
P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App.1991). 
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In the instant case, Mr. Norris's counsel failed to timely request a Bill of 
Particulars. This was deficient performance because, as argued above, Norris did not 
understand that exact nature of the charges against him, and was unable to 
adequately assist in the preparation of his defense. More importantly, counsel came 
to court the morning of trial patently unprepared, relying on his belief that the trial 
would be continued. He did not investigate the State's witnesses, nor discuss witness 
statements with Norris, nor subpoena witnesses for the defense, nor submit proposed 
jury instructions, nor prepare exhibits, Moreover, when counsel realized that the trial 
would not be continued, he pressured Norris into entering a plea of guilty, when the 
plea had not been previously discussed and he knew that Norris was absolutely intent 
on going to trial. Clearly, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different 
if counsel's performance would have been effective, because Norris would have 
exercised his right to a jury trial, which he felt forced to waive only because of the 
ineffectiveness of his counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Norris respectfully asserts that trial court erred by 
denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Furthermore, the trial court erred by 
refusing to appoint substitute counsel for Norris, and thereby forcing Norris to 
represent himself with regards to critical stages in the criminal proceedings. 
45 
Additionally, the criminal information failed to provide sufficient notice of the nature 
of the charges against Norris, so as to allow him to adequately prepare his defense. 
Moreover, the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations where the conduct 
underlying the charges occurred in Spring of 1993, and the felony information could 
not have been effectively filed, so as to toll the clock for the purposes of the statute 
of limitations, until October 1999, when the remittur on the misdemeanor case was 
issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. Finally, Norris was denied effective assistance 
of counsel when his attorney failed to request a Bill of Particulars, and showed up for 
trial unprepared, and thus placed Norris in a position where he had no choice but to 
plead guilty. Based on the foregoing, Norris respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand it to the trial court so Norris can withdraw his plea 
of guilty. 
DATED this C_ my of December, 2001. 
/ \ A 
SHARONPRESTON 
Attorney for Richard Norris 
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ADDENDUM A 
± U^W 1 KJL 1 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud -- Elements -- Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another 
money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the 
obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the 
total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice 
described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described in 
Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently 
deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose.of executing or concealing a scheme or 
artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make known, 
recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, 
radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, representations, promises, 
or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth. 
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